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Saving Arnavutköy: The Contemporary 
Cultural Politics Of Turkey
Rogelio Miñana
I don’t want to be a tree, I want to be its meaning.
Orhan Pamuk, My Name Is Red
Can a tree speak? Can a dog talk? Can a man narrate his own 
beheading? According to Orhan Pamuk’s novel My Name Is Red (1998), 
in sixteenth-century Istanbul they could. The most internationally 
acclaimed Turkish novel of recent times focuses on the artistic process 
itself. In the novel, the Sultan commissions a group of artists to under-
take the illumination of a book celebrating his realm, but asks them to 
employ European-style artwork. Affronting the rules of Islam, which 
prohibit the use of representational images and allow only figura-
tive ornamentations, these artists paint following the Venetian dictates 
of perspective and realism. Soon after their project secretly begins, a 
series of murders occur.
But the power of art does not only determine the fate of the char-
acters in the novel. The narrative style is also influenced by the art 
of Islamic miniaturism. Instead of using a conventional omniscient 
narrator, Orhan Pamuk fragments his story into a myriad of narrators 
who, like symbolic figures in a miniature, narrate events from their 
own (often non-realistic, highly symbolic) perspectives. Thus, the first 
narrative miniature of the novel is told by a corpse: “I am a corpse” are 
his first words (3). Later, a talking dog challenges the reader when he 
claims, “I’m a dog, and because you humans are less rational beasts 
than I, you’re telling yourselves, ‘Dogs don’t talk.’ Nevertheless, you 
seem to believe a story in which corpses speak and characters use 
words they couldn’t possibly know. Dogs do speak, but only to those 
who know how to listen” (11). In similar fashion, a man tells of his own 
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beheading (404), two painted dervishes speak to their readers/viewers 
(307), and a painted tree confesses its contentment in not being realis-
tic, and “not because I fear that if I’d been thus depicted all the dogs in 
Istanbul would assume I was a real tree and piss on me: I don’t want to 
be a tree, I want to be its meaning” (51).
According to Pamuk’s interpretation of sixteenth-century Istanbul, 
art and religion are intimately connected. As one of the master illumi-
nators in the novel states, “Through our colors, paints, art and love, 
we remember that Allah had commanded us to ‘See!’ To know is to 
remember that you’ve seen. To see is to know without remembering” 
(76). If art is a means to know the world, we can better appreciate 
Allah’s creation only through art: “Allah created this earthly realm 
so that, above all, it might be seen. Afterward, He provided us with 
words so we might share and discuss with one another what we’ve 
seen. We mistakenly assumed that these stories arose out of words and 
that illustrations were painted in service of these stories. Quite the con-
trary, painting is the act of seeking out Allah’s memories and seeing the 
world as He sees the world” (79).
But as the Prophet commanded, art should never compete with 
Allah’s creation, and therefore should never use representational, real-
istic images. Words and art must depict the world through a sym-
bolic discourse, since only when “the world had been newly created,” 
words carried their meaning within themselves: “you’d say ‘horse,’ 
then mount it and ride away” (386). Art and words are codes that must 
be deciphered to interpret their hidden meanings, lost shortly after the 
creation of all things. According to Pamuk, the power of symbolism in 
art is thus an essential part of Turkish cultural and even religious heri-
tage. And as one of the main characters in My Name Is Red affirms, the 
power of miniatures is such that “if you stare long enough your mind 
enters the time of the painting” (405).
Entering the meaning of art is certainly an inescapable (and pleas-
ant, I must add) activity in Turkey. In a country where East and West 
meet, and where ancient civilizations from all across Europe and Asia 
have left traces of their wealth and traditions, one could argue that the 
history of Turkey is written in its architecture. Turkish buildings, like 
dogs and trees in My Name Is Red, do indeed talk. Hittites, Mongols, 
Greeks and Romans, Kurds, Armenians, and Ottomans, to name only 
a few, established the physical foundation of their respective cultures 
by means of their unique architecture. The most recent layer in Tur-
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key’s history thus far, the Kemalist republic, continues to leave its own 
imprint in the public buildings erected after 1923.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of the Republic of Turkey that 
ended centuries of Ottoman rule in 1923, initiated a process of mod-
ernization based on Westernization and secularism. As part of this 
movement, Ataturk and his followers created a cult of personality that 
sharply contrasts with Islamic iconoclastic principles.1 Even today, 
chances are that every square and public space (and even restaurants 
and businesses) displays an image, painting, photo, figure, or statue of 
Ataturk. Keenly aware of the power of art, Kemal was savvy in his use 
of painting, sculpture, cinema, writing, and of course architecture to 
contribute to his main cause: the consolidation of the new republic.
Ataturk and his followers soon realized that architecture was essen-
tial in winning the hearts and minds of Turkish nationals who, after 
centuries of Ottoman rule, were embarking on the construction of a 
nationalistic, modern, secular state. As Resat Kasaba explains, “the 
underlying assumption was that once the environment was altered, 
the behavior of individuals could be easily molded and made to fit 
the requirements of the newly created circumstances” (24).2 In fact, 
as Sibel Bozdogan points out, “the new architecture effectively legiti-
mized the architect as a ‘cultural leader’ or ‘agent of civilization’ with 
a passionate sense of mission to dissociate the republic from an Otto-
man and Islamic past.”3 The new architects broke with previous archi-
tectural and artistic trends in two key senses. First, they looked for 
inspiration in European cubism and modernism with a strong Clas-
sical-style component, acknowledging Greek and Roman influences 
over Islamic, Ottoman ones.4 Later, they developed the “Milli Mimari” 
or new nationalistic architecture, which stressed the idea that the Turks 
were the originators of modern civilization, while still recognizing Hit-
tite, Classical, and even Islamic influences.5 No matter what the new 
architecture looked like, it certainly required both massive construc-
tion (the capital city of Ankara being the best example), and grand-
scale processes of destruction and reconstruction. This was the case in 
Istanbul, especially during the 1950s under the personal supervision 
of Adnan Menderes (a sort of Turkish Robert Moses of the time) when 
“the cutting of wide thoroughfares and traffic arteries through his-
torical fabrics” became a common practice in cities such as Istanbul.6 It 
was only after the 1980s that a group of architects and urbanists began 
to react to what Bozdogan describes as “the austerity and paternalism 
of official modernism,”7 but without truly opposing the dictates of the 
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government to advance their process of modernization and renewal 
in Turkey. Only in recent years have architecture and urban construc-
tion ignited an international movement to oppose the destruction of 
Istanbul’s Arnavutköy neighborhood in order to build a third bridge 
over the Bosphorus strait.
The nationalistic and religious implications of official Kemalist 
architecture cannot be dismissed. Under Ataturk’s direction, the First 
Historical Congress of Turkey took place in Ankara in July of 1932. 
According to Resat Kasaba, during that “historical” congress there 
was “no mention of the ethnic diversity of the Ottoman Empire and no 
discussion of what had happened to its Christian subjects.”8 The mod-
ernizing efforts of Kemalist architecture, especially during the first 
decades of the republic, emphasized the Classical, Greco-Roman style 
while making no artistic reference to the Christian Orthodox tradition 
of the Byzantine period. As Ataturk was secularizing Turkish political 
practices, religious minorities were directly affected by the strife the 
country had suffered (and would suffer again) during the tumultuous 
first thirty years of the twentieth century. Most Turkish ethnic and reli-
gious communities, if not all, have suffered their own trials since the 
end of the nineteenth century. Even within the Islamic majority, Sunnis 
and Alevi Muslims clashed during the 1960s riots in Istanbul.9 And 
the Christian minority in particular (Armenians, Greeks, Albanians) 
was subject to a series of political measures and popular dislike that, 
to offer but one example, slashed the population of Greeks in Istanbul 
from 100,000 circa 1923 to a few thousand in 1997.10 The forced migra-
tions after the Turkish-Greek war in January of 1923, the Capital Tax in 
1942, the consequences of the Cyprus conflict for Greek Turks in 1955 
(attacks on Greeks in Istanbul) and 1964 (12,000 more Greek Turks 
expelled) all contributed to the tensions between the government and 
Turkish Christian minorities.11 Even though Christians were not offi-
cially forced to convert to the “official faith” (Sunni Hanefi Mez Heb), 
Christian conversions increased as tensions and clashes became more 
apparent.12 By the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire 
acted ruthlessly against Christian minorities in Trabzon and Ankara.13 
For Çaglar Keyder, the deportation and massacre of Armenians in 
Anatolia (nine-tenths of the population was eradicated) and of the 
Pontus Greeks on the Black Sea coast still provoke “embarrassment 
and shame.”14 By 1997, the Armenian population in Istanbul (approxi-
mately 30,000–35,000) found itself under political pressure because of 
terrorist attacks by Armenian radical groups against Turkish interests 
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abroad during the 1980s, and for the popular belief that Armenians 
sympathized with the PKK (the Kurdish independence group) during 
the 1990s. The assumption was that both the Kurds and the Armenians 
favored the disintegration of the republic.15
*****
If buildings talk in Turkey, as we might assert from Orhan Pamuk’s talk-
ing corpses, dogs, and trees, there is no doubt that Turkish urbanism 
and architecture reflect the clashes and tensions between the govern-
ment and minorities. In fact, one of the most prominent manifestations 
of the tensions between Kemalists and the Christian minority during 
the 1980s was the destruction of numerous Byzantine historical monu-
ments.16 The actions of the Turkish government prompted Patriarch 
Demitrius I to complain to former President George H. W. Bush in 
1990, seeking international sympathy for the preservation of Christian 
monuments in Turkey.
In recent years, Turkish cultural politics have been affected by the 
country’s aspirations to join the European Union. Early on, Brussels 
imposed a number of conditions for giving Turkey a starting date for 
the negotiation process toward accession. One requirement is a clear 
commitment by the Turkish government to respect the rights of ethnic 
and religious minorities. In fact, as recently as June of 2004, the state-
controlled television broadcasted in Armenian, Kurdish, and other 
minority languages for the first time.
In another key shift, several governmental decisions affecting histor-
ical sites and monuments are being challenged by locals. For example, 
conservationists are fighting to stop a dam project that would destroy 
the eastern medieval town of Hasankeyf. In addition, the government 
intends to transport the ancient mosaics found in Zeugma, a Roman 
site on the Euphrates now submerged by a dam, to Istanbul; however, 
locals are protesting this decision in an effort to keep the mosaics in 
the area. It is in Istanbul itself where the tensions between the central 
government and locals have acquired a more significant dimension 
regarding the magnitude of the protests and their international reper-
cussions. The Ankara proposal to build a third bridge over the Bos-
phorus, which would require the destruction of practically the entire 
neighborhood of Arnavutköy, located on the European side of Istanbul, 
has been met with a vigorous and so far successful civic movement to 
preserve the area and its unique architecture.
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H. H. Günhan Danisman and Ismail Üstün recount the convoluted 
history of this multi-ethnic neighborhood, which covers a period of 
more than 1,500 years. Throughout seven stages of migration, “the 
ratio of 90% Christian to 10% Moslem at the beginning of the twentieth 
century becomes 95% Moslem to 5% Christian at the end of the cen-
tury.”17 First called Hestai, Arnavutköy, it became a notorious place of 
worship during the Byzantine period, when it was known as Promotu 
or Anaplous. The name Arnavutköy is first recorded in 1568, most 
likely due to Albanian (Arnavut means Albanian in Turkish) settlement 
in the area after Fatih Sultan Mehmet conceded sovereignty to Albania 
(Altinisik). Predominantly Greek from then on, Jewish and Armenian 
settlers also inhabited the town for most of the pre-20th-century era. 
Following the turmoil and forced migrations of 1923, 1942, 1955, and 
1964, the town lost most of its Christian population, yet managed to 
preserve (albeit in a precarious state) its unique architecture. According 
to the Armenian Patriarchate, Arnavutköy is the last standing example 
of “the famous wooden-house architecture which characterized the 
rich style of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is one of the last 
areas to support a functional Greek school and church, and contains 
the ruins of an ancient, and yet undocumented synagogue and other 
sites.” The Decree 9483 of the High Council of Monuments claims that 
in Arnavutköy there are 38 monumental constructions, 292 examples 
of civil architecture, 5 natural green conservation areas, 42 Yalis or 
waterfront houses from the Ottoman era, 30 monumental trees, and 
several retaining walls and garden walls. In fact, the government has 
awarded this town protection by special decree.18 Currently, approxi-
mately 5,300 people live in the village, including 250 ethnic Greeks, 
Armenians, Jews and the U.S. Consul General,19 as well as the pop star 
Tarkan, among other famous residents.20
In late 1998, the Highways Department of the central government 
announced controversial plans to build a third bridge across the water-
way, which would “devastate the neighborhood’s important architec-
tural and historic fabric.”21 Even though the government has never put 
forward a formal proposal on the Bosphorus bridge between Kanidili, 
on the Asian side, and Arnavutköy, several high officials have hinted 
that the beginning of construction could be imminent. Faced with this 
prospect, the people of Arnavutköy quickly mobilized and attracted 
rare international attention for their cause. Conservationist efforts claim 
not only that the architectural and historical heritage of Arnavutköy is 
at risk,22 but also that the third bridge will not solve traffic congestion 
Rogelio Miñana
247
problems. In 35 points, the association in defense of Arnavutköy pres-
ents the case that a third bridge would increase the number of vehicles, 
not passengers, that cross the Bosphorus every day. Traffic-related pol-
lution, construction costs, and the practical destruction of Kandili and 
Arnavutköy on both sides of the Bosphorus are, according to conser-
vationists, enough reasons to favor the construction of an underwater 
railway tunnel rather than another Bosphorus bridge.
Saving Arnavutköy is, in sum, a case in point in contemporary 
Turkish cultural politics. A country constantly struggling to keep up 
with the European Union’s incessant demands, Turkey is facing a new 
period in which the political class needs to be more attentive to the 
whole of Turkish society, including its minorities. In the case of Arna-
vutköy, environmentalist concerns and the preservation of the architec-
tural heritage of the Christian minority go hand in hand with an effort 
to confront a government that has historically (especially throughout 
the 20th century) been hostile toward the ethnic inhabitants of the 
area. As the Armenian Patriarchate notes, “the fate of Arnavutköy, 
and the disregard with which the government approaches this impor-
tant historical site, ultimately reflects to Turkish citizens, visitors, and 
architectural historians everywhere, the fate of our society as a whole.” 
Turkey’s image within and beyond its borders is at stake.
*****
The international press has echoed this unusual development in con-
temporary cultural politics in Turkey, where environmental, artistic, 
and minority-rights concerns all converge in the struggle to save Arna-
vutköy. The political situation in Turkey has not traditionally encour-
aged resistance to the government. As late as 1999, as Amberin Zaman 
noted in the Los Angeles Times, “Turks are reluctant to join in any orga-
nized challenge to the state. Those who do, be they Islamists seeking 
the right to wear head scarves in public buildings or Kurds demanding 
schooling in their own language, usually face arrest.” In that sense, 
Zaman concludes, “The ‘Say No to the Bridge’ campaign reflects a new 
willingness among Turks to stand up to the government.” The efforts 
directed at saving Arnavutköy do not mark the first time civic pro-
tests have delayed a state-proposed project, such as the construction 
of power plants; however, the Arnavutköy movement possibly consti-
tutes the first objections leveled at a large-scale public works project in 
a nation where “the power of the state has always been strong and all 
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but unquestioned.”23 The significance of Arnavutköy thus goes beyond 
the struggle to save the singular architecture of the neighborhood. As 
Ozen Danisman, one of the leaders of the Anavutköy Citizens Initiative 
states, “We [local residents] became aware of our own power—that we 
are citizens and we have our own rights.”24
The consequences of the campaign to save Arnavutköy are therefore 
far-reaching and may even help reassure the European Union of the 
truly democratic nature of the Turkish state. On March 7, 1999, the 
former Minister of Public Works and Housing, Mr. Ali Iliksoy, was 
expected to attend a meeting between high-ranking officials of the 
Ministry of Transport and the residents of Arnavutköy. Mr. Iliksoy had 
to postpone his visit, but the briefing still took place in the Sports Club, 
marking “probably the first time ever that high officials of any ministry 
in Turkey took ordinary citizens seriously to give them a briefing.”25 
For that reason, and perhaps with the help of the European Union’s 
pressure to open up the Turkish government to its people, “the concept 
of NGOs and citizen’s initiatives such as the Arnavutköy initiative are, 
no doubt, the rising values of a coming era.”26
Ultimately, saving Arnavutköy is also a campaign to strengthen and 
renew democratic practices in Turkey. From a previous, rather authori-
tarian politics of culture, Turkish citizens and the government are mov-
ing towards a different political culture, in which decisions are openly 
challenged, causes are championed, and the nation’s architectural pat-
rimony is hopefully saved. •
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Notes
1. Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, pp. 283–85.
2. The examples of what Deniz Kandiyoti calls “cultural nationalism” are numerous, 
from architecture to the emancipation of women from Islamic fundamentalism, which 
the new Republic employed as a hallmark of secularization. (p. 125.)
3. Bozdogan, “The Predicament,” p. 138.
4. Bozdogan, Modernism and Nation Building, chap. 1–5, pp. 1–238.
5. Ibid., chap. 6, pp. 240–93.
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6. Bozdogan, “The Predicament,” pp. 140–141; pictures of these massive urban renewals 
appear in pages 142–144.
7. Ibid., p. 147.
8. Kasaba, p. 29.
9. Poulton, pp. 262–65.
10. Ibid., pp. 272–78.
11. Ibid.
12. Deringil, pp. 68, 84.
13. Ibid., pp. 78–81.
14. Keyder, p. 44.
15. The controversy over the Armenian massacre continues. Last year, the Canadian-
Armenian filmmaker Atom Egoyam premiered his movie Ararat, in which he denounces 
Turkish political and ethnic violence against Armenians. The Turkish government 
reacted by setting up a webpage, linked to the official Ministry of Tourism page, deny-
ing some of Egoyam’s claims and contextualizing the Turkish-Armenian conflict from its 
own perspective. See Poulton, pp. 275–78.
16. Poulton, p. 274.
17. Danisman and Ustün, p. 3.
18. Aslaneli.
19. Zaman.
20. Aslaneli.
21. Danisman and Üstün, p. 1.
22. Heritage at Risk.
23. Kinzer.
24. Moore.
25. Alemdar, p. 4.
26. Ibid., p. 5.
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